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CIVIL PROCEDURE-JuDGMENTS-MUTUAUTY AS REQUIREMENT FOR
ASSERTION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST CLAIMANT WHO WAS CLAIMEE

PRIOR ACTION-Plaintiff corporations, the sole shareholder of which was
their president, sued defendant insurers to recover for the alleged theft
of the corporations' furs. In an earlier criminal action, the president (conceded by the corporations to be their mere alter ego for purposes of res
judicata) had been convicted of attempted grand theft, conspiracy to commit grand theft, and the filing of fraudulent insurance claims for loss of
the same furs; it was there determined that the president had staged the
theft of the furs. In plaintiffs' civil action, the superior court rejected
defendants' plea of collateral estoppel as to the non-occurrence of an actual
theft, but, after verdict for plaintiffs, granted defendants a new trial. On
appeal, held, reversed and entry of judgment for defendants directed. Even
in the absence of mutuality of estoppel, a claimant which was claimee in
a prior action may be collaterally estopped to assert the existence of a fact
vital to its cause of action in a second suit if the non-existence of that fact
was adjudicated in the prior action. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion
Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962).
Unlike merger and bar, collateral estoppel is a form of res judicata
which precludes the relitigation of factual issues actually determined in a
prior action.1 Traditionally, collateral estoppel could be applied only
IN

1

By contrast, in merger and bar the first judgment is conclusive both as to matters
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where there was mutuality of estoppel; that is, unless both of the adverse
parties to the subsequent action were subject to being estopped to contest
factual issues already resolved in a prior action, neither party could be
so estopped. An exception to the mutuality requirement developed in
cases in which the liability of the defendant in the second suit would
be dependent upon the culpability of a person who had been exonerated in
a prior suit brought by the same plaintiff on the same facts as would be
necessary to maintain the second action.2 For example, if A sued a truck
driver and lost, collateral estoppel would preclude A's subsequent suit,
based on respondeat superior, against the driver's employer.8 In many
jurisdictions, this exception has evolved into a partial rejection of the
mutuality requirement.4
In the context of the question whether the party to be estopped was
claimant in the first action, in the second action, in both actions, or in
neither action, there are four possible exceptions to the mutuality requirement; while no court has abolished the mutuality requirement in all four
situations, California has now specifically rejected the requirement in three
of them. A number of courts have held that there is no mutuality requirement where the party against whom the estoppel is pleaded was
claimant in both the first and second actions. This is attributable to the
courts' reluctance to permit a plaintiff to retry his case each time a new
defendant can be found.IS In Bernhard v. Bank of America, 6 one such
case, the California court stated by way of dictum that there were only
three substantive requisites for the assertion of a collateral estoppel: (1)
that there be identity of issue, (2) that the first action have proceeded to a
final judgment on the merits, and (3) that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the first action.7 Obviously, this rule was much broader than was required by the facts
of the Bernhard case, where the party estopped was claimant in both actions.
actually litigated, and as to those matters which might have been litigated. See REsrATE•
47, 48 (1942). But direct estoppel, a fourth form of res judicata,
precludes the plaintiff from relitigating only those matters actually determined in a prior
action on the same cause of action. See id. § 45(c).

MENT, JUDGMENTS §§

2

Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. lll, 127 (1912) (dictum). See also

57 HARV. L. REV. 98, 105 (1943).
8 Further illustrations of this exception are the relationships of principal and agent,
and indemnitor and indemnitee.
4 In some cases courts have said that they no longer require mutuality of estoppel,
even though those cases, on their facts, would fall within the master-servant or indemnitorindemnitee exceptions. E.g., Cohen v. Superior Oil Corp., 16 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1936);
Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
IS Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955). In Coca-Cola Co.
v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. (6 Harr.) 124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934), the court rejected the
mutuality requirement on the ground that the plaintiff had selected his forum in a prior
action, and, having had a full opportunity to present his proofs, he should not be per•
mitted to relitigate the same issues against a second defendant.
6 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P .2d 892 (1942).
7 Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
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In Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, a California court went farther and,
following Bernhard, implicitly rejected the mutuality requirement for the
collateral estoppel of a claimee who had been the losing claimant in the
prior action.8 The principal case, going yet a step farther on the authority
of the Bernhard dictum, was the first to hold mutuality unnecessary in the
third situation9-where the party estopped is claimant in the second action
but was claimee in the first action.10 If the California court continues
this trend and follows the Bernhard doctrine to its logical conclusion, it
may eventually reject the mutuality requirement in the fourth possible
situation. That situation involves the estoppel of a party who was the
claimee in both the first and second actions. Suppose, for example, that
an airplane disaster should take the lives of forty passengers. Under the
broad language of the Bernhard dictum and the equally broad rule proposed by numerous commentators,11 the judgment in the first wrongful
death action against the airline, if successful, would collaterally estop the
carrier to deny liability in the remaining thirty-nine suits. No court, however, has gone this far to date.12
Due process of law prohibits the collateral estoppel of one who has not
had his day in court.18 Where due process is not violated, the problem is
simply one of fairness: to what extent should the mutuality requirement
be discarded in order to estop one who has already had an opportunity
to litigate the elements of his claim or defense? This determination should
result from a balancing of the policy underlying res judicata-that there be
s 119 Cal. App. 2d 125, 259 P .2d 70 (1953). ,
In Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927),
plaintiff brought an action on a fire insurance policy. In an earlier action, plaintiff had
been convicted of burning the same goods for the loss of which he now claimed. In a
perplexing opinion, the court said that the judgment in the first action was not res
judicata because of the lack of mutuality. However, inasmuch as plaintiff had previously
had his day in court on the same issues, he was not permitted to re-open them in the
subsequent action.
10 If a court applies collateral estoppel where the prior action was criminal, as in
the principal case, it would most probably also apply it where the prior action was civil.
The courts would be more hesitant to allow collateral estoppel where the prior action
was criminal, since the privilege against self-incrimination would have permitted the
defendant to keep much of his proof undisclosed. This would at least balance the fact
that a greater burden of proof is required for a criminal conviction.
11 See, e.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled To Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241
(1923); 35 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1926): "Assuming an identity of issue and a judgment on
the merits, the only requirement should be that the one against whom the former judgment is invoked was a party, or a privy of a party, to it."
12 One court has permitted the former judgment to be "conclusive evidence" against
one who was claimee in both the prior and the subsequent cases. United States v. 'Wexler,
8 F.2d 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1925). However, the case presented no possibility of multiple claimants. In the first action a divorce had been obtained against the defendant on grounds of
adultery. The second action was brought to set aside the defendant's certificate of
naturalization on the ground of immoral character.
13 United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D. Conn. 1959).
An exception to this rule is the case where a party has participated in the prior adjudica•
tion as a "secret defendant." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120
F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941).
II
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an end to litigation1~against the prejudice resulting to the litigant against
whom the estoppel is asserted.15
One reason offered in justification of the mutuality requirement is that
litigants do not always defend or prosecute to the utmost; thus, failure
in the first suit should not preclude a more energetic subsequent contest.16
However, the courts have already rejected this argument in the masterservant exception to the mutuality requirement, for a plaintiff's failure to
succeed in an action against the servant is universally held to preclude the
possibility of a more energetic subsequent contest against the master. Likewise, in the Bernhard and Valentine situations, the unsuccessful claimants
in the prior actions were precluded from attempting more energetic contests against other adversaries in subsequent actions. In short, the failure
of parties to prosecute or defend to the utmost on all occasions has apparently been of no moment to courts deciding cases which present the same
policy considerations as the principal case; evidently, then, the possibility
of a desultory prosecution or defense of the first case should not be entirely determinative of the solution to the problem.
In the principal case, the court correctly rejected the argument that
mutuality should always be required for the collateral estoppel of one
who was the claimee in the prior action.17 To require mutuality in all such
cases would be unresponsive to the fundamental considerations of policy
underlying the rejection of the mutuality requirement in other situations.
The better view would be that mutuality should not be required for collateral estoppel where it is shown that the party estopped had an opportunity to present his full case in the prior action, and that he would not
be prejudiced by the application of estoppel. In the principal case, for
example, both of these requisites were fully met. The parties estopped
had the fullest opportunity in the first action to present their case as to
the occurrence of an actual theft,18 and, being claimants in the subsequent
action, they were able to choose the forum and set the bounds of the litigation.
More significant, perhaps, was the California court's uncritical willingness, in the principal case, to follow the Bernhard dictum without reconsidering the policy behind the principle of mutuality. The language of
14 E.g., Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 273, 288 (Pa. 1833). But see Atkinson v. White, 60
Me. 396 (1872).
15 See principal case at 604, 375 P .2d at 441.
18 See Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929).
17 Professor Currie argues that, where the claimee in the prior action is the claimant
in the subsequent action, mutuality should be required, because he did not have the
initiative in the former adjudication. He argues that, without mutuality, there would be
a danger of multiple claimants. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 312 (1957). However, in his example of a bus
company being sued by one passenger and subsequently by others, the company is
claimce in both instances. Should the bus company desire to become claimant in a suit
against the operator of another vehicle, the multiple claimant problem would not be
present in such subsequent suit.
18 See note IO supra.
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the opinion19 makes it clear that the court did not recognize the danger
that its reaffirmation of the Bernhard doctrine might precipitate the extension of that doctrine to instances where the party to be estopped is
claimee in both actions and there is a possibility of multiple claimants,
e.g., the hypothetical airplane disaster.20 Abolition of the mutuality requirement in this situation would prejudice the claimee in two distinct
ways. First, the jury might compromise the liability question by finding
for the first plaintiff and awarding proportionately lower damages. In all
subsequent actions brought by other plaintiffs, the claimee would be
estopped to deny liability, and only the question of damages would be
submitted to the jury. In such subsequent actions, the juries would be
likely to render verdicts for the full amounts of the respective claimants'
damages.21 The claimee would be prejudiced in a second way by having
to withstand the probability that more claimants would recover. For e:l{ample, where forty plaintiffs join in a class action or, without being able
to benefit from res judicata, sue independently in separate actions, the
claimee risks a full recovery by each plaintiff only once. However, without
the mutuality requirement, were the plaintiffs to sue one at a time, the
claimee in defending the first suit would actually be risking a full recovery
by all forty. In the second suit he would be risking full recovery by thirtynine, etc. While the claimee would be subject to the same maximum recovery, the chances of recovery would be greatly enhanced. Assuming that
all plaintiffs sued and were unsuccessful, the last plaintiff to sue would have
had forty opportunities for recovery. With forty plaintiffs, there would
have been eight hundred and twenty opportunities for single-plaintiff recovery. The factor by which the opportunities for recovery are multiplied
becomes larger as the number of possible plaintiffs grows. Such increased
opportunities for single-plaintiff recovery would have a disruptive effect
on insurance rates. In the final analysis, then, the requirement of mutuality should be retained only where the party to be estopped was unable,
by reason of his opponent's initiative, to present his full case in the prior
action, or where his status as claimee in both actions would expose him
to a greater risk of recovery by reason of a possible procession of claimants.

William E. Wickens

See principal case at 604, 605, 375 P .2d at 440, 441.
United States v. Wexler, 8 F.2d 880 (EJ).N.Y. 1925), illustrates that a claimee who
was claimee in the prior action might not be prejudiced by his being collaterally estopped
in the absence of mutuality. See note 12 supra.
21 See Currie, supra note 17, at 288,
19
20

